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A methodology for calculating warhead, weapon system,
and combat system lethality is described for use in AE 3705,
a Naval Postgraduate School course in warheads and
lethality. A template to outline the methodology and two
case studies using the template are developed. The case
studies may be used as examples or given as class projects.
The first case study considers a generic missile system
versus a sea skimming cruise missile. The second case study
considers a generic medium caliber gun system versus the
same sea skimming cruise missile.
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I- lORODDCTION
The Surface Warfare Officer in today's navy is faced
with the substantial task of learning to operate and luain-
tain increasingly complex combat systems. The increasing
cost, complexity, and capabilities of these systems is in
turn being driven by the increasing complexity and capa-
bility of opposing weapons systems that the modern combat
system must be capable of handling. A key asset to any
Surface Warfare Officer would be an understanding of the
basic concepts and factors affecting warhead design, target
survivability, and combat system lethality. In order to
assist officers in developing an understanding of these
concepts a course in warhead design and lethality is offered
at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School. This thesis
describes a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of
a given warhead against a given target and includes two case
studies in Appendix B and C which may be given to students
either in the form of a class problem or as an example. A
template which incorporates the methodology for working
these types of problems is also provided in Appendix A to
guide the student in the problem solution. The first case
study considers a generic surface to air missile (SAH)
system versus a generic sea skimming cruise missile. The
final result of the case study is the single shot prob-
ability of kill,PK55 / for the given SAM system against the
given target.
The second case study evaluates the effectiveness of a
medium caliber gun system using generic unguided projectiles
with a proximity fuzed warhead against the same sea skimming
cruise missile threat. The final result of the second case
study is a cumulative probability of kill, P^ , for the gun
system based on values of P^^j obtained at varying ranges.
1 1
After completing two case studies involving different
weapons systems against the same threat, the student should
have developed an appreciation of the factors affecting each
system and should be able to compare the relative effective-
ness of similar combat systems.
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II. MISIM lETHALITI
A. PEOBABILITY OF A KILL GIVEN A DETONATION
A logical place to start in the determination of an
overall combat systems effectiveness or lethality would be
to examine the lethality of the warhead associated with the
system. In the case of a proximity fuzed warhead, the most
common way of measuring the warhead's lethality is the prob-
ability of a target kill given a warhead detonation, Pk/d •
For a contact fuzed warhead, the lethality is measured by
the probability of a target kill given a hit on the target,
?^/^ . This Chapter deals with P^^^ since most air defense
systems rely on proximity fuzed warheads.
The probability of a kill given a detonation is depen-
dent on both the design of the warhead and the target's
vulnerability to the warhead damage mechanisms.
B. "WARHEAD CHARACTEEISTICS
Proximity fuzed warheads normally consist of a high
explosive filler surrounded by a metal casing and a fuzing
package. The fuzing package consists of a target detection
device, TDD, a logic circuit that initiates detonation at
the proper time, a safety and arming device to prevent acci-
dental detonations, and a detonator with a primary explosive
to initiate the high explosive filler. The design of the
case is dependent on the type of darjage mechanism desired.
High explosive, HE, warheads are classified by the type
of damage mechanism they employ. The four basic types of HE
warheads are blast, fragmentation, continuous rod, and
shaped charge. The primary damage mechanism of a blast
warhead is the shock wave produced by the high explosive
13
core. The case of a blast warhead is relatively thin to
reduce the amount of energy lost in breaking up the case.
Fragmentation warheads rely on the high velocity fragments
formed when the case breaks up as their primary damage
mechanism. Fragmentation warheads use either a natural
fragmentation case or a controlled fragmentation case. The
natural fragmentation case is a smooth case that splits into
random sized fragments. The controlled fragmentation cases
use scoring, grooving, external wire wrapping, or internal
rings to force the case to break up into fragments of a
desired size and shape. Some controlled fragmentation cases
that do not require a strong case for structural reasons use
preformed fragments embedded in a plastic matrix.
Continuous rod warheads use a bundle of rods linked in
series and placed around the outside of the warhead case, as
the primary damage mechanism. The damage mechanism for
shaped charge warheads is a high velocity jet and slug of
molten metal formed when the shaped explosive crushes a
metal liner. The fragmentation warhead is the most common
type of warhead used against aircraft because it covers a
large area with effective damage mechanisms. Figure 2. 1
shows a typical high explosive fragmentation warhead.
The determination of P^/d requires the ability to calcu-
late fragment trajectories and fragment densities at speci-
fied ranges from the burst point. A number of warhead
characteristics can affect the Pk/^? , including charge to
metal ratio, C/M, explosive type, and fragment characteris-
tics, such as size, weight, velocity, and total number.
Another key factor is the warhead geometry which affects
fragment ejection spray angles.
Factors affecting fragment trajectories are the intial
fragment velocity, the static spray angles, and the fragment
shape and density. Those parameters affecting fragment
density are the total number of fragments, and dynamic spray
angles.
14
REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE












Figure 2.1 Fragmentation Warhead
1 . Fragment Size and Number
Normally the metal case weighty M, is constrained by
geometry to fit within a missile diameter or gun barrel;
thus fragment size and fragment number, N, are not indepen-
dent. Picking a particular fragment size specifies the
total number of fragments and -vice versa. The total case
weight can be calculated by knowing the density of the
metal and calculating the volume from the given dimensions.
N =
case weight, M, (grains)
fragment weight (grains/fragment)
(2.1)
2. Fragment Initial Velocity'
R. W. Gurney theoretically cGtablichcd the initial
velocity of fragments from fragmenting munitions in 1943.
He derived what is now known as the Gurney formula,
where Vq is the initial fra^jment velocity from a static
warhead detonation,
-JlZ is the 3urney constant which is a
function of the explosive used, C is the mass of the HE
charge used, and H is the total mass of the fragments.
Values for the Gurney constant can be found in [Ref. 1:
Table I]. The charge mass, C, can be determined either by
calculating the volume and multiplying by the density of the
explosive, or for an existing warhead by looking it up in
the appropriate technical manual.
3 . Z£ac[ment D ensi ty at I mpac
t
Fragment density
, P » is directly proportional to
the number of fragments and inversly proportional to the
square of the radius, R, that the fragments have traveled
from the point of detonation. It is also dependent on the
dynamic spray angles,m., of the warhead. Equation 2.3 gives
the fragment density as a function of R, where 0, is the
dynamic fragment spray ejection angle for the leading edge
of the fragments, and is the trailing edge dynamic frag-
ment spray ejection angle.
pm = A/_ (2.3)
Note that the R in equation 2.3 is not necessarily
the distance between the warhead and target at detonation,
^DET I i^ut is the actual distance the fragments have traveled
at impact.
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C. TARGET VDLNERABILITY ASSESMENT
When calculating ? j^/o target characteristics such as
target vulnerability must be considered. Target vulner-
ability is defined as the inability of the target to with-
stand one or more hits by the damage mechanisms from the
warhead. Targets that are more vulnerable are softer and
easier to kill. In order to determine the effect of target
vulnerability on Pk/o ' ^ vulnerability assesment must be
conducted. A vulnerability assessment can be carried out at
one of three general levels of detail. The three levels
,
in order of increasing complexity, are estimates, evalua-
tions , and analyses. For example, an estimate will use
simple equations for target vulnerability measures that are
functions of a few major parameters of the target, the
damage mechanisms, and the terminal effects parameters.
Analyses are very detailed studies using specific technical
information and are usually conducted with digital computers
using complex models of the aircraft.
No matter what the level of assesment, there are certain
required elements common to all levels. These common
elements are; (1) a selection of target kill levels
required, (2) assembly of a technical description of the
target, (3) determination of the target's critical compo-
nents, (4) selection of the specific weapon system to be
used against the target, (5) an analysis to identify the
type and amount of damage required to kill each critical
component, and (6) the computation of the appropriate
vulnerability measure for the components and the entire
aircraft based on the weapon system chosen. An in-depth
description of these six elements can be found in [Eef. 2],
a summary of each element is given below.
17
''
• Select Kill level Requi re d
Four different attrition kill levels have been
defined with their primary difference being the amount of
time it takes for the target aircraft to fall out of
control. The four levels are:
-"KK"-Kill - immediate or catastrophic kill




loss of control within 30 sec.
-"A"- Kill - loss of control within 5 min.
-"B"- Kill - loss of control within 30 min..
In a shipboard air defense problem, the key factors
affecting the choice of kill levels are target speed or
closing rate, and weapon intercept range from own ship. In
most cases the "B"-kill is net satisfactory for the air
defence problem because the target could still complete its
mission and re-engagement would be necessary. Even the
"A"-kill may be unsatisfactory for high speed targets
engaged by close in weapons systems.
2- Technical ^ ZJJIictional Targ.et Description
A technical and functional description of the target
must be assembled. In many cases this information may come
from intelligence estimates and comparisons with similar
systems. The technical description should include location,
size, construction, materials used, and operation of all
major subsystems and components. The functional description
should define functions of these components. Cross section
drawings may be all that is required for an evaluation, but
a thorough assesment for an analysis requires much more.
3. Critical Component Analysis
A critical component, as defined by [Ref. 2], is any
component which if damaged or destroyed would yield a
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defined aircraft kill level. Seme components could be crit-
ical components for an "A"-kili but not for a "KK"-kill.
The first step in a critical component analysis i s to iden-
tify the flight and mission essential functions that the
aircraft must perform to accomplish its mission. The second
step is to identify the major system and subsystems that
perform these essential functions. The third step is to
conduct a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to iden-
tify the relationship between component failure modes and
performance of the essential functions. The fourth step is
to relate component failure modes to combat caused damage.
This is known as the Damage Modes and Effects Analysis, or
DMEA. Finally a visual presentation of the critical compo-
nents, known as the kill tree, or a logical expression known
as the kill expression, is developed. The kill tree / kill
expression help to identify the critical components for a
given kill level including any redundancies involved.
U. Damage Mechanism Sel ec tion
This consists of selecting the specific damage
mechanism to be studied. Typical damage mechanisms consid-
ered are (1) non explosive penetrators or fragments, (2)
fragments and blast from internally detonating warheads, (3)
external blast, (U) the fragments, penetrators, and debris
from externally detonating warheads.
- • Critical Component Kill Criteria
Once the critical components have been identified
the kill criteria for each of the failure modes of the
components must be determined for each of the selected
threats. Four specific kill criteria are currently used for
externally detonating warheads. They are the probability
of a component kill given a hit,
^i^/h ' ^^^ area removal
criterion, the energy density criterion, and the blast
damage criterion.
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a. The P^/^ Function
The P>^/^ function defines the probability of a
component kill when hit by a fragment or penetrator. This
criterion is a function of the mass and velocity of the
damage mechanism. The determination of the P^^^for a given
component is extremely difficult. Numbers for P^/^ are
eventually assigned based upon a combination of empirical
information/ engineering judgement, experience with similar
systems, and experimental or combat data. Although values
of Pj^z for individual components may not be precise, they
can be guite useful when conducting comparisons between
different damage mechanisms. The P^/>^ criterion is particu-
larly useful against components that can be killed with a
single hit such as hydraulic lines, electronics, crew
members, control rods, fuel tanks, warheads, and engines.
Components where the Pf^/^ function would not be as useful
are large area type components such as wings or control
surfaces.
b. Area Removal
The area removal criterion defines a specific
amount of area that must be removed from a component in
order to kill that component. This criterion is particu-
larly useful in evaluating the effect of large penetrators
or closely spaced fragments against structural components,
or lifting and control surfaces.
c. Energy Density
A component kill is expressed in terms of a
minimum component surface area exposed to a threshold level
of kinetic energy density. It is applicable to closely
spaced fragment hits on structural components, control




A component kill is usually expressed in terms
of a minimum overpressure on an aircraft surface necessary
to cause a component kill for the specified kill level.
This criterion is usually applied to structural components
and lifting / control surfaces.
6 . Com putation of Vulnerability Measures
a. Vulnerability to Non-explosive Penetrators or
Fragments
An aircraft's vulnerability to penetrators or
fragments can best be measured by its vulnerable area. Ay
The vulnerable area concept can be applied at the component
level and is defined as the product of the component's total
presented area, A^, and the component's ?^/ . For the ith
component,
since both presented area and P;^/^ vary with
aspect, the vulnerable area also varies with aspect. For an
aircraft with nonredundant critical components and no crit-
ical component overlap, the sum of the vulnerable areas is
equal to the total vulnerable area of the aircraft
Av = IV, (2.5)
The probability of an aircraft kill given a hit on the
aircraft is
Pk/H = ^V / Ap. (2.6)
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Cases where critical components overlap each
other complicate the computation of vulnerable area. In the
case of overlap, the overlap area is normally considered as
a separate component and separate P^/^, and A^ are computed
for the overlap region. In computing the P^/^ for the
overlap area, the fact that kills of more than one component
are not mutually exclusive must be considered. The P;^/^ for
the overlap area becomes;
P/^/H, ='-^50 = 1 - (1 - P;^A. ) (1 - Paa, ) (2.7)
for two critical components, andthe vulnerable area is
A^^ = A^^ X P;^/^^ (2.8)
Provided the individual components P^/^ remains
the same, overlapping components result in a reduced vulner-
able area. Sometimes overlapping components can change the
P^/^ of the individual components. For example, overlapping
a fuel tank and engine can lead to increased P^/^ for the
engine resulting in an overall increase in vulnerable area
for the overlap region.
Cases where there are redundant components or
redundant components with overlap further complicate the
measurement of vulnerability. A more in depth coverage of
these situations may be found in [Ref. 2].
b. Vulnerability To Externally Detonating HE
Warheads
The primary damage mechanisms associated with
externally detonating warheads are the fragments from the
warhead case. Blast from the high explosive is usually a
secondary effect. In most cases a warhead detonation close
enough to kill a target by blast will also kill the target
22
with fragments. As in the single fragment case, vulnerable
area is still an intrinsic measure of a targets vulner-
alility to an externally detonating warhead.
Another more descriptive measure of vulner-
ability is the probability of a kill given a detonation of
the external warhead, P^/^ . Pk/o^^ egual to P^"^ , the prob-
ability the aircraft is killed by n independent, random hits
from the detonation. In general,
where P^/^ is the probability the aircraft is killed by the
jth random hit, and n can be calculated by the product of
the fragment density, n , and the area presented, Ap
.




j(i - P^f; ) = exp (- 1 P^;; i
and
Pk/h = Av / Aj
y .
For the case of no redundant critical components, the vuln-
erable area for the jl
for all hits, leaving
Pj^/^ = 1 - exp(-p Av. ). (2. 11)
^K/D = 1 - exp (-P/n Y. ^v )
in ;
th hit. Ay , is assumed to be constant
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D. DETEBHINATION OF Pk/d '• "^^^ ENDGAME ANALYSIS
In order to determine the relationships between the
variables within the Pk/d expression, an "Endgame" analysis
must be conducted. Equation 2.11 gives an approximation for
P^/fP . In order to evaluate this expression for a detonation
at a given point, the fragment density and the target vuln-
erable area must be known. Equation 2.3 gives us an expres-
sion for p as a function of distance from the blast, K, the
dynamic spray angles 0^ and , as well as the number of
fragments, N. The dynamic spray angles are functions of
both static and dynamic warhead parameters, as well as
target speed, and encounter geometry. A convenient distance
to use in P^^^ calculations is the distance from the target
that the detonation takes place,
^otr • Since the target
moves during the time between warhead detonation and frag-
ment impact R is not equal to Eoet » ^^^ ^ relationship
between the two must be developed. Another factor to be
considered in the determination of P^^^^ is that the vulner-
able area changes with aspect, hence the average impact
angle of the fragments with respect to the target is needed.
1 . Ea^il vs. La te Bird
The first step in the endgame analysis is to deter-
mine the relative geometry involved in the warhead / target
encounter. There are two basic types of intercept geometry
that can occur, the "Early" bird and the "Late" bird. In
the early bird geometry the warhead crosses the target line
of flight ahead of the target and in the late bird the
warhead crosses behind the target. The primary difference
between the two geometries is that the sign of the warheads
static fragment ejection spray angles change. For fragments
coming off the top of the warhead the static ejection angles
are positive and for fragments coming off the bottom of the
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warhead the static ejection angles are negative. The
assumption of early or late tird geometry must be made
before proceeding with the endgame analysis.
2- Dynamic S^ra^ Ang les
The dynamic spray angles, (p_^ , are determined from
the vector addition of the missile velocity vector, V,^ , the
average fragment velocity vectcr, V^ , and the reversed
target horizontal velocity vector, V^. . The dynamic spray
angle, cp^ , is then found by taking the arctangent of the
ratio of the X and Y components of the resultant vector
which gives a dynamic angle relative to the horizontal axis,
"^X f and then subtracting the missile heading, @ , to get a
spray angle relative to the missile axis. Equation 2.12 and
2.13 give the dynamic spray angles.
(pi= ^i - 9 , for i = 1,2 (2.12)
lfi= Arctan / MmSlNQ 4- Vo S/N (9 -H o(l) \ (2.13)
VVrn COS 9 + VeCOsO^-qfA) -Vt/
Another useful angle to determine at this time is
the angle of the center fragment with respect to the refer-
ence direction, Tcp • This is done by taking the average of
the Yi <^s shown in equation 2.14.
Kp= ( y, + ^2 )/2 (2. 14)
This is useful because the reference direction is normally
picked to be in line with the target's course, which makes
^cF the fragment incident angle on the target. Figure 2.2
is a diagram of the endgame parameters.
25
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Figure 2.2 Endgame Parameters
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3. Detonation Range vs. Fragment Travel Rang^e
The ratio of E to RpgT is needed so that the frag-
ment spray density, p, in the P^^^p equation can be described
in terms of R^^r • Ihe ratio is determined by taking the
ratio of the magnitudes of the absolute fragment velocity
vector, Vp^ , and the fragment velocity vector relative to
the target, %/j . Equations 2.15 through 2.17 give the
ratio between R and R.OCT •
(2.15)
where
\%o, I = V^a, =V<V^+ 7ocoso{cp)2 + (V^ sinotcF}^ (2. 16}
and
IV^/t' = V(V^^ cos(2rcf) - Vt.)2 + (V^^ sinofcF)2 (2.17)
^ • Effect of F ragment I ncident Angles on Vulne rabl e
Area
In a vulnerability analysis the vulnerable area is
determined from many aspects. The Ay from the aspect
closest to the fragment incident angle is used in the calcu-
lation of
^K/o* In a vulnerability estimate the vulnerable
area is computed for only a few aspects. If the fragment
incident angle is not close to one of these aspects an
approximation must be made.
A simple approximation to the effect of fragment
incident angle on vulnerable area is to project the vulner-
able area from two orthogonal target aspects onto a plane
perpendicular to the fragment incident angle. This is
called the projected vulnerable area and is given by
equation 2. 18.
27
REPRODL'CED AT GOVERNMENT EXPEN!
Projected Ay = Ay, \ sin {Yct:.)l + ^Vzl^^^ iYcp) (2. 18)
Figure 2.3 shows the geometry involved,
TARGE T Av Av^
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Figure 2. 3 Projected Vulnerable Area
5 . Calculation of P j^^ :
Having determined the dynamic spray angles, CD^, the
ratio of R to Epcr » ^^^^ the projected A^ we can now deter-
mine the fragment spray density as a function of detonation
range, p (EpgT-) , and P^^^ as a function of detonation range.
K/D (E OCT ), from equations 2.15 and 2.3. Equation 2.19
gives the fragment density as a function of detonation
range, and equation 2.20 gives us the P^^/q as a function of
EpET •
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P(</o (Rpet) = 1 - exp(-p(Roe^) ^ projected Ay) (2.20)
In calculating this
^k/d* ^^^ assumption is made that the
fragment spray pattern covers the entire target. Figure 2.
U
shows the dynamic spray angles superimposed on a target.
The spray angles define four separate zones where fragments
hit the target. If a warhead detonates in zone I, all of
the fragments will cover only a portion of the target. In
zones II and III a portion of the spray pattern will cover a
portion of the target. Only in zone IV does all of the
spray cover the entire target. In zones I, II, and III prior
to calculating Pj^/jj , the vulnerable area of the target will
have to te reduced to reflect the actual area covered by the
spray pattern.
6 . Lethal Radius
Since Pk/d ^^ highly dependent on the point of deto-
nation, another, sometimes more useful, measure of target
vulnerability to a given warhead is the lethal radius, r^j .
The lethal radius is determined by finding the point along
the centerline of the fragment spray zone, Tcf * where the P,^p
equals one half. Figure 2.5 shows a typical Pf^^^ function
and the lethal radius. The lethal radius parameter is
useful for evaluating different warheads against the same
target, and also is used in the calculation of P^gg .
29
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Figure 2.4 Fragment Spray Zones
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Figure 2.5 Lethal Radius
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III. WEAPON SYSTEM LETHALITY
A. PROBABILITY OF A KILL GIVEN A SINGLE SHOT
The probability of an aircraft kill given a single shot,
P«gg , is a measure of a weapons systems overall effective-
ness or lethality. Pj^gg is computed on the assumption that
the target has been detected and that a weapon has been
launched or fired. Thus, the P^^gs takes into account the
ability of the fire control and giiidance systems to direct
the propagator to the target's vicinity, the probability of
correctly fuzing, and the target vulnerability to the
warhead damage mechanisms. A F^ss can be computed for both
gun and missile systems using the basic two dimmensional
equation in the intercept plane.
Pkss = f fpi^^Y) * ?f {x,y) V{x,y) dx dy (3.1)
-co -OO
Equation 3.1 shows how the Pks$ is calculated, where p(x,y)
is the miss distance frequency distribution, P^ (x,y) is the
probability of fuzing for a HE/FRAG warhead, and V{x,y) is
the kill function that defines the probability the target is
killed due to a propagator whose trajectory intersects the
intercept plane at x,y. For a contact fuzed warhead, the
kill function V(x,y) is simply the probability of a kill
given a hit, Pk/a/ ^^'Y) f over the target area and is zero
elsewhere. For the proximity fuzed warhead, V(x,y) becomes
the probability of a kill given a warhead detonation,
^k/p '
which was covered in Chapter two.
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B. MISS DISTANCE DISTEIBOTION FUNCTION
The miss distance frequency distribution function,
p{x,y) or yO (r) , can be thought cf as a measure of the weai-on
systems fire control or guidance accuracy. Chapter six of
[Ref. 2] expresses p(x,y) as the bivariate normal distribu-
tion shown below in equation 3.2, where and are the
and are the standard deviationsmeans, and
/
P(x,y) = ^-^g.- exp
2 (7/ 2 o;2
(3.2)
If the two means are assumed to be equal to zero and the
standard deviaton in both the x and y directions are assumed
to be equal, then/D(x,y) can be simplified to the circular
normal distribution function of equation 3.3
p^^^
~- rh-r"\' 2~d?. (3.3)
The r is the miss distance from the target , and G"^ is the
standard deviation of the miss distance. A more descriptive
term, the Circle of Equal Probability, or CEP, is often used
in place of (J^. The CEP is the circular miss distance
within which one half of the shots fall. The CEP is related
to G'r by equation 3.U.
CEP = 1.177 0"^ (3.4)
C. FUZING PROBABILITI
The fuzing probability, P^ , is an important factor in
the Pf<55 equation. There are nany factors that can effect
the fuzing probability, including miss distance, relative
velocities, and encounter geometry. It can best be thought
of as the probability that the warhead fuzes at the proper
time to maximize the damage to the target. For a lethality
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estimate it is normally considered to be a constant less
than one. Sometimes a fuze cutoff range r^ is also used
such that P^ equals zero for miss distances greater than r^
.
When P^ is considered to be a constant it also becomes a
limiting value for the Pkss equation. For example, if
Pp = 0.8 the maximum obtainable Pks5 is also 0.8.
D- KILL FUNCTION APPROXIMATIONS
For proximity fuzed warheads, the kill function V(x,y)
or V (r) can be expressed as Pj^/n . Recall that the P^/^ func-
tion has the form,
1 - exp (constant/ R^^ ) (3.5)
where R^g^ is the detonation distance. Combining this
expression with the bivariate or circular normal miss
distance distribution function results in an expression for
Pf^55 for which there is no closed form solution. This
problem can be solved by making an approximation to the P
function which, when combined with the miss distance distri-
bution, does lead to a closed form solution. There are two
approximations to the P^/c, function that are often used.
They are the "cookie-cutter" kill function and the Carlton
kill function.
1 • Ik^ CDokie-Cutter Kill Function
Perhaps the simplest kill function is the "cookie-
cutter" kill function. Recall that the lethal radius, r^
,
is defined as the point where P^c/p is equal to 0.5. Usually
the lethal radius is used as a cutoff point such that;
Pk/d = 1 for < r < r,
34
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Figure 3.1 Cookie-Cotter Kill Function
For a circular cookie-cutter kill function and a circular






. .rjL r dr de (3.6)
For a square box cookie-cutter kill function and a bivariate









ZQl^ 2 ct;^ dx d(3 y.7J
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2 • The Carlton Kill Functi on A22£2xil§t ion
A more accurate method of approximating the kill
function is obtained hj using the circular Carlton kill
function shown in equation 3.8 telow
V(r) =P^/p =exp (-r2/r|) =exp (-x2/r2) exp (-y2/r2) (3.8)
In the Carlton function, r^ , is a scaling parameter used to
adjust the Carlton function to provide a close approximation
to the Pk/p function. One method of picking r© is to colo-
cate the Carlton and PK/p functions at r =0 and r = Cx
Fhen r = rj, , P^^p =0.5 and equating the two functions gives
\</D
= 0.5 = exp (-rf / r/) (3.9)
solving equation 3.9 for r gives
r,= 1.2 r. (3.10)
Another method is to equate the area under the Pk/p func-
tion, known as the lethal area, A^., to the area under the






The circular Carlton kill function along with the
circular normal miss distance distribution result in the




exp -r2 r dr de (3.12)
Using the bivariate normal distribution and the two











E. EVALUATING SINGLE SHOT KILL PfiOBABILITY
Closed form solutions to the Pk^s integrals are desired
in order to simplify the calculation of P^j^ in the determi-
nation of a weapons systems lethality. Consider the P^^jj
equation obtained from the circular normal distribution and
the Carlton kill function, equation 3.12. It can be further
simplified to
KSS C, r exp(C2 r2) dr d9 (3. 14)
O Q-
where C, and Cg are the constants shown below
C, =
2 cr^^ T'2Tra;2
Solving the integral above gives
C, TT f r=ftc
P,,, = ---- exp(C,ra,|
^^^
Since Cj is a negative constant, this becomes
C,
c,ir
Pkss = --- (0 - 1)
-2 v-2
Substituting in the values of C, and C^ gives the closed
form solution
KS5 = P. r/ + 2cr^2
(3.15)
where r^ = 1.2 r^ or r| = Ai^/Tf , depending on which way was
chosen to calculate r^
.
Table 1 provides a summary of the Pk55 e'-iuations for the
different combinations of kill functions and miss distance
distributions.
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F. CORRECTIONS TO THE Pj^^j EQUATION
1 • Ih^ Effects of a Fuze Cutoff
If a fuze on the warhead has a cutoff range^ r^ / the
P^S5 for the circular Carlton kill function is nearly the
same, except that the limits of integration in the radial
direction no longer extend to infinity but must stop at the
fuze cutoff range. Changing the upper limit for r in euua-
tion 3.14 to r^ and performing the integration result in the
following equations
=
-^— X (1 - exp(C2r2))
Cg
Note that this corrected P^gg equation is merely equation
3.15 multiplied by a correction factor given by equation
3. 16 below
fuze cutoff correction = 1 - exp {C^r^) (3.16)
This correction factor reduces the P^gs because it is always
less than one for any finite value of r^. .
2- Correction to P^ss -^ --- ^isinim Z^L^^%.§.
Low flying or sea skimming targets pose an addi-
tional problem in that some missiles will impact the water
prior to reaching the proper detonation point. The problem
is best seen by looking at it in both the intercept plane of
Figure 3.2 and in a plane perpendicular to the intercept
plane. Figure 3.3.
For Ep£T greater than h = H/sinaf^p in the intercept
plane, where H is the target altitude, the missile impacts
the water before reaching Rp^T- • The presence of the ocean
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Figure 3. 2 Intercept Plane
V
as. -ii " « ^ . «.WATER
Figure 3.3 Target Plane
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affects the limits of iEtegraticn in the Pksj e-iuation. On
the upper half plane r still goes from zero to infinity but
on the lower half plane r is limited by the ocean surface to
r = h/sin (2tT -9) . The result is to split up the Pkss inte-
gral into two integrals, one over the upper half plane, and
the other over the lower half plane as follows
KSS C, r exp(C2 r2) dr d©
C, r exp (Cj r2) dr d©
o-' o
IT"
Solving the first integral we obtain
-C,Tr/ 2C2







Adding the two together and substituting for C






2Tr j \sin2 (2Tr-0)y
Note that this is just the original formula for P^j^ multi-
plied by a correction factor which is less than or equal to
one. The integral in the correction factor can be solved
using a calculator and Simpson's rule.
G. CDMDLATIVE KILL PEOBABILITI
The calculation of a single shot kill probability gives
a basic measure of a weapon systems lethality. In order to
maximize a combat systems lethality, usually more than one
weapon is fired at a given target. The cumulative kill
probability, P^
,
gives a measure of the weapon systems
41
ability to handle one specific threat. Because P,^ is one
minus the cumulative probability of survival, ?j , and Pg is
the product of the probability of survival for each shot,
the equation for Pj^ is
?K = 1 - Ps = » - TTd - Pkss^ ) (3.17)
ki\
where n is the total number of shots and P KS$ is the kill
probability of the ith shot. for the case where P
constant for each shot, equation 3. 17 reduces to
KSS . IS a
^K = 'I - (1 - PksS ) (3. 18)
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IV. COHBAT SYSTEM LETHALITY
The preceding Chapters developed the methodolgy for
determining both a warhead and the weapons systems
lethality. Modern combat systems are usually composed of
more than one weapons system, along with various sensor
systems, which are coordinated by some form of command and
control system. The combination of weapons systems, sensor
systems, and control systems into a single combat system
adds another dimension into the lethality calculations.
Time is an extremely important factor in the system
lethality. For example, a highly lethal weapon system that
takes minutes to react to a threat would not be an effective
combat system against multiple targets, even though P^^^ = 1.
A. MEASURES OF COMBAT SYSTEM LETHALITY
There are two important measures of combat system
lethality that must be looked at together in order to
adequately assess the lethality of the entire system. The
first measure to be considered is the lethality of the
weapons sytems which was discussed in the previous chapter.
The second measure to be considered is the threat handling
capacity of the system in the face of multiple threats.
''
• Threat Handling Capaci t_^
A combat system's threat handling capacity is
defined to be the maximum number of threats the system can
handle without allowing any threat to go unchallenged. It
can be considered as the saturation point of the system.
Any further increase in the number of threats results in
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saturating the combat systems defenses. Any threat that is
not engaged by a weapon system, before reaching the weapon
system's minimum range, is called a leaker.
2 • Threat Survival
Every threat engagement has only two possible
outcomes, either the threat is killed or the threat
survives. The outcome of a number of engagements is
described by the binomial distribution in which the prob-
ability of survival, Pg , is one minus the cumulative kill
probability, P^ . For a given number of engagements, Ng , the
number of survivors, Nj , is estimated using the binomial
distribution having the mean , jj , and variance, HT, # given
by equations 4.1 and 4.2 below
average number of survivors = /^^ = % Pg (^-l)
variance = <^ = Ng Pj P^ (4.2)
B. FACTOBS AFFECTING COMBAT SYSTEM LETHALITY
A number of factors have an effect on the lethality of a
combat system. Some of the more important factors are
layered defenses, target detection ranges, system response
and engagement times, and the number of simultaneous engage-
ments the system is capable of handling.
1 . Tar ge t Detec tio n Range
Target detection ranges affect combat system
lethality because the time available for the combat system
to counter a specific threat increases with target detection
range. There are several factors which affect the range at
which a target is detected, including radar power levels,
target radar cross section, target altitude, and radar
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jamming levels. Perhaps the most limiting factor in the
case of a low flying cruise missile is the target altitude.
Target altitude determines the range to the radar horizon
which can be computed using
D = 1.23 (Vl + V^ ) (4.3)
where D is the distance to the radar horizon in nautical
miles, h is the radar height in feet, and H is the target
altitude in feet. For low flying targets, the radar horizon
is usually much less than the normal target detection range
of the radar.
2. System Response, Acq uisition, and Engagement Times
A major factor in the lethality of a combat system
is the overall time the system takes to respond to a new
threat, acquire the threat with a fire control system, and
complete an engagement of the threat. The response time is
the time recjuired for the system to detect and begin a track
of the target. The acguisition time is the time required to
designate a track to a fire control radar and have the fire
control radar acquire or "lock on" to the target. The
engagement time is equal to the aguisition time plus the
time of flight of the missile or projectile.
3« Target Se£aration Interval
Another important factor in threat handling capacity
of a combat system is the time interval, At, between succes-
sive threats. If the time interval between successive
threats is less than the engagement time, ET, each succes-
sive threat will penetrate to a closer ranye than the
previous threat before being engaged by the system. Given
enough threats, the system will eventually be saturated.
For intervals greater than the engagement time, the threat
handling capacity is limited only by the magazine capacity.
as
^» il]i2i.i2l§ ZLL^ Control S ystems
Comtat systems with multiple fire control systems
have the capability of controlling simultaneous threat
engagements. Since each indivivual system can conduct an
engagement, the net effect is to increase the interval
between targets that each individual system must handle.
For example, a combat system with two fire control directors
doubles the time interval between threats as seen by an
individual fire control system since each director engages
only every other target. Equation 4.4 gives the adjusted
time interval. At, as a function of the original time
interval and the number of fire control radars available,
NFC.
At^= (At / NFC) (4.4)
C. DETERMINING COMBAT SYSTEM LETHALITY
In order to determine a combat systems lethality against
a specific threat we start by determining the threat
handling capacity of the outermost layer of defense,
followed by the remaining layers of defense. The following
outlines the procedural steps necessary to evaluate threat
handling capacity:
(1) determine the target detection range,
(2) determine target range when track is established,
(3) determine range of first intercept,
(4) determine range of subsequent intercepts,
(5) determine the number of threats required to
penetrate to the minimum weapon range or next
layer of defense (threat handling capacity)
,
(6) estimate the number and interval of threats
the next defense layer will be confronted with,




• I§£2.§t: Detec tion Range
Target detection range will be the lesser of the
following ranges: (1) the minimum expected burn through
range for a given target cross section and level of jamming,
or (2) the radar horizon range for the given target altitude
as given by equation 4.3. This target detection range can
be corrected for the additional distance the target will
travel during the finite time it takes for the search radar
antenna to rotate once.
2 . Track Ra nge
Once a target is detected it normally takes at least
three data points to establish a track. The range at which
a track is established, TR, is the detection range, DE, plus
the product of target velocity, V^- , and the time required
for at least two more rotations of the radar antenna, ARI.
TE = DR + (Vt X 2 X AEI) (4.5)
^ • Intercept Range s
Assuming the decision tc engage the target has been
made by the time a track is established, we now want to know
at what range the first intercept, IE, , and subsequent
intercepts, IRn/ will occur. The first intercept range can
be found by subtracting the distance the target travels
during the time of flight, TOF, from the launch range, LR,
as shown in equation 4.6.
IR, = LR, + (TOF X Vt) (4.6)
where TOF is equal to the launch range divided by the rela-
tive velocity of the two missiles
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TOF, = !£,/ (V^, - Vt,) (4.7)
The initial launch range is egual to the track range plus
the distance the target travels during the aguisition time,
AT, and is given by
LH, = TB, + (AT, X V^.^) (4.8)
Substituting equations 4.3 and 4.7 into equation 4.6 results
in equation 4.9
IE, = (TE, (AT, X V^^) ) X VE, (4.9)
where VE, is the velocity ratio (Vm/ ( V^,
-
Vt, ) ) .
At the time of the first intercept the second target
will be at a range equal to or greater than the first inter-
cept range, depending on the value of ^t , as given by
target two range = IE, - (4t*x V^) (4.10)
The second intercept range can be found by substituting the
appropriate subscripts for target two into equation 4.9
giving
IE2= ( (IE, - idt*V^) + ATg Vt) X VEg (4.11)
Assuming all parameters remain the same for each engagement,
equation 4.11 can be made into a recursion formula to find
the subsequent intercept ranges
IE„^, = (IB„ + Vt(AT -At*)) X VE (4.12)
48
^ • l^E§§t Handling Ca£acit j^
Threat handling capacity can now be determined by
comparing the subsequent intercept ranges to the minimum
range of the weapon system, Emin • when the (n + 1)th inter-
cept range is less than Rmin then the system has reached
saturation and the threat capacity is e^ual to n. Thus
TC = n for IE„^, < E^,„ (4. 13)
5 . Subsequent Layers
In order to estimate the threat encountered by the
next layer of defense, the numter of leakers, N^,, and the
number of survivors, N5 , must te calculated for a specified
number of attacking threats.
a. The Number of Leakers
Once a threat is determined to be a leaker,
(IR^^, < R^,„), subsequent intercept ranges are calculated on
the basis that the fire control system skips over the
leakers and engages the first target with an intercept range
greater than R,y,,„ . These intercept ranges are given by
IRLt^= (IRu + VyCAT - iZ^t)) X 7E (^.1^)
where lE^ is the last valid intercept range obtained, and i
is an integer counter which is increased by one until an
intercept range is found that is greater than R^i», . By
calculating intercept ranges in this manner, the total
number of engagements, N^ , can be determined for a speci-
fied number of threats.
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t. Number of Survivors
The average number of survivors, N5 , is deter-
mined from N£ and the cummulative probability of kill P^
using equation 4.1.
c. Threat Interval For Next Layer
The average threat interval for the next layer
of defense can be determined from N(, , N£ , and the threat
interval ^t, of the previous layer. The average threat
interval is computed by taking the total time for a speci-
fied number of threats, divided by the number of threats
reaching the next layer, as shown below
Prior to saturation N is zero and the average threat
interval for the next layer reduces to
('-pK)^/E Ns
Calculating Zit2 prior to level one saturation gives a
measure of how well the second level compliments the first.
Calculating ^tg after level one is saturated is useful to
determine if level two will also be saturated. Figure 4.
1
is a diagram showing intercept ranges, threat saturation,
and threat intervals.
^ • QX^£^i.l. I!li£^^;t C a£a cit X
The threat handling capacity for the entire combat
system is the sum of the individual threat capacities for
each layer of defense.
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Figure 4. 1 Combat System Saturation
D. SDflMABY AND CONCIOSIONS
This thesis develops a methodology for determining the
effectiveness of a combat system. First, the factors
affecting warhead lethality were analyzed. The warhead was
then integrated into a weapon system and the factors
affecting the weapon system were analyzed. Finally the
weapon system was integrated into a combat system and the
factors affecting combat system lethality were analyzed. A
template was developed to guide students in the problem
solution and two case studies were provided as examples.
The methodology developed in this thesis incorporates a
number of simplifying assumptions to allow a student to
perform these calculations by hand or with the did oi a
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calculator. The potential exists for this methodology to be
expanded in key areas and then to develop a computer program
to accomplish the calculations. With the aid of a computer
program students should be able to analyze the effects of
changes in specific parameters en the overall combat system
lethality. For example, students could examine changes in
warhead characteristics, weapon system accuracy, combat
system response times, or target characteristics. Studies





This template is to be used as a guide for calculating
weapon system lethality in the form of a single shot kill
probability and a cumulative kill probability.
A. WAEHEAD PARAMETEES
GIVEN: charge weight C = or density =
metal weight M = or density =
Guerney constant J2E = or explosive;
static spray angles o^| =
<^2=
fragment size = and density =
warhead geometry: (drawing or dimensions)
FIND: fragment weight in grains =
charge to mass ratio C/H =
fragment initial velocity V^ =
total number of fragments N =
(N may be adjusted to reflect
percentage of case that fragments)
Useful Equations:








GIVEN: target velocity V^ =
target drawing: including dimensions, component
locations, and sizes.
DETERMINE:
Presented area Ap =
Minimum kill categories reauired:
(function of range and velocity)
Critical components for selected kill categories:
ESTIMATE: component P^^ for the desired kill categories:
CALCULATE: Vulnerable area from one or more aspects.
EQUATIONS:
component vulnerable area;







Early or late bird =
static warhead o^i =
spray angles oi'g =
fragment number N =
•X-
fragment velocity V^ =
ENCOUNTER PARAMETERS:
Missile/Projectile
velocity V„ or Vp =
missile approach angle 0^ =
target velocity V^ =
target vulnerable areas Ay
top/side =
front /rear =
(* values may be adjusted to reflect average velocities)




range ratio R/Rp^^ =
fragment spray densities
as a function of R p (R) =
as a function of Rq^t Oi^oer )~
projected vulnerable area
projected Ay ( ^f^p ) =
Probability of a kill given a
detonation Pk/d (P(Roet) ' ^V/ (^cp ) ) =
(calculate at various points as desired)
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EQUATIONS:
V„ sin (©) + Ve sin ( © +of; )
X: = arctan I^ \y^ cos(e) + Vo cos(e+ori) - (v-^)/






= Y^^M + Vo cosa^cF)^ + (Vo sino^cp)^
|V^/T 1= yiVfo. COS(rcp) - Vt.)2 + (V^^ SiLnF)2
N
^ ~ 2Tr X R2 X (cos {0,) - CDS (^) )
Projected Ay, = k^^ \siniy^p)\ + Ay^ |cos(y^p)
^K/D ^ ^ ~ ^^P("P ^ projected ky)
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D. DETEBHINATION OF WEAPON SYSTEM LETHALITY
GIVEN:
Circle of Equal Probability CEP =
or
standard deviation 0'^.=
fuzing probability P^ =
fuze cutoff range r^ =
fragment spray density as a
function of RpgT P (Rdet ) =
projected vulnerable area Ay(y^p)




target altitude H =




for desired kill levels
Carlton scaling parameter (r^,
)

















single shot kill probability (Pj^g^ )







fuze cutoff correction factor =




(weapon system lethality) P^^ =
EQUATIONS:
CEP = 1. 177 0"^
K/D
= 0.5 = 1 - exp(-p(ro) Ay)
K$s = Pj
r|
r2 + 2(0;) 2
fuze cutoff factor = (1 - expCC^ r2)
c -(- .llAJ.Ii })










h = H / sin (y-cp)
n
= ' -x, <^ - ^«,,
)
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E. DETSBMIKATIOH OF COMBAT SYSTEM LETHALITY
GIVEN:
TARGET DATA:
Cumulative kill probability P^ =
Target altitude H =
Target velocity V^ =
Target separation interval At =
Number of attacking threats Ny=
COMBAT SYSTEM DATA:
Missile/projectile velocity V,,, =
fire control acquisition time AT =
number of fire control radars
NFC =
search radar height h =
antenna rotation interval ARI =
weapon system minimum range
^min ~
FIND:
target detection range DR =
track range TR =
velocity ratio 7R =
range of first intercept IR| =











threat handling capacity TC =
average target separation interval
for the next defense layer
before saturation At2 =
after saturation Atz =
EQUATIONS:
radar horizon D = 1.23 ( -/h + V^ )
{D} = nm. {H} and {h} = ft.
DR = D + (0.5 X ARI x V,-)
TR = DR + (Vt X 2 ARI)
7R = V„ / (V„ - 7t)
IE, = (TR + (AT X V^)) X VR
IB^,, = { IR„ + Vt-(AT -£it^)} X VR
At^= At, / NFC
TC = n for IR„+, < R^,>,
IRj,^^ = (IRl V7.(AT - iAtT) X VR
% = Ne (1 - P^)
Atg = (Nl + NE)At, / (N^. + Ng)
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REPRODUCED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
APPENDK B
SAM SYSTEM ?S. CEOISE MISSILE
This is a case study of a generic surface to a ir missile
(SAM) system versus a generic sea skimming cruise missile.
The object of the case study is to determine the lethality
of the weapon system against the cruise missile and also to
assess the contribution of the weapon system to the overall
lethality of the associated combat system.
A. WABHEAD PARAMETEBS
GIVEN: charge weight C =
_y or density = j.C'55^_/ts.A>>'




or density = Ji.i.-^_!^/'^^
Guerney constant '/ZE = ^JOO or explosive: RDX
static spray angles c<, = SO
fragment size = ^S_ inj_ and density = i.'?^_?_'^*/'"











fragment weight in grains = ^JdM.
charge to mass ratio C/M =
_UJ^,Y.
fragment initial velocity \ - J77.^5'__
total number of fragments K = 2. 6 OJ
(N may be adjusted to reflect
percentage of case that fragments)
ijiaeful Et^uations:







18in X {Vr/n) (112 - 22)in2 x .0596 Ib/in^ = 98.6 lbs
case weight: M
ISin X (ir/4) (122 _ Ii2)in2 x .283 lb/in3 = 92 lbs.
fragment weight:
(.53)in3 X .283 Ib/in^ x 7000 gr/lb = 247.5 gr
.
charge to mass ratio: C/M = 98.6 / 92 = 1.07
fragment initial velocity:
Ve = 9300 X yi. 07/(1 + (1.07/2)) = 7765 fps
number of fragments: N
(921bs X 7000 gr/lb)/ 247.6 gr/fragment = 2601
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B. TARGET DESCRIPTION
GIVEN: target velocity V^ = i'i>op_ffS




Presented area Ap = 2Q_._f_£i}
Minimum kill categories required:
(function of range and velocity)
K > 10,000 yds. (30 sec. from impact)
KK < 10,000 yds.
Critical components for selected kill categories:
guidance, warhead, fuel tank, engine
ESTIMATE: component Pj^/^ for the desired kill categories:
see tatle 2





Ay = JA 'V
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Early or late bird = LAJLE. gABhl-
static warhead of, = _-_^0
__?P_
spray angles 0(2 = iLlSl
_'J^_
fragment number N = 2JiOO_
fragment velocity V^ = 7000
ENCOUNTER PARAMETERS:
Missile/Projectile
velocity V„ or Vp = 2000__
missile approach angle 9„ = jliL^
target velocity Vy = -_looo_i(>s
target vulnerable areas Ay
top/side = S,_H7S_ S^H75;_
front/rear = .S'3 .35
PIND
{* values may be adjusted to reflect average velocities)
dynamic spray angles 2J] =
~^Z. _^_L
0. = z^-Z— _6i
Ycf= lLQL3_ _H3._6__
range ratio R/^det = J-93— -'Ji9—
fragment spray densities
as a function of R yO (E) = ll'i/.Bl 1111.8.1.
as a function of Rpf^ p(^0Er ^^ lIi.L%Lr \^I-^ZBs.er
projected vulnerable area
pro j ec t ed A ^ ( /c p ) = 5Ji2S_ JiJj>__
Probability of a kill given a
detonation P^/p iPi^oer) > V (^f ) ) = -.l^i^f-^') j^I^^Slj')
(calculate at various points as desired)
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EQaATIONS:
y / V;^ sin ie) + Vo sin ( © +«x ) \
0; = arctan )
\ V^, cos (9) + V» cos(e+9r;) - (Vt)/
itf/r 1= ^/i'ffa. cos(^^) - V7.)2 + (v^^ sinycp)2
N
'^ 2ir X R2 X (cos ( 0, ) - cos ( 0^) )
Projected Ay = A^^ lsin{ji^p)i + Av | cos ( y^P )





2000 sin (-30) + 7000 sin (-30 -80)
2000 cos (-30) + 7000 cos (-30 -80) - (-1000)
2r, = arctan
= -87
Y / 2000 sin (-30) + 7000 sin (-30_-1 1 0)_
2 -
arc
^^(^2000 cos(-30) + 7000 cos(-30 -110) - (-1000)^
= -115.6
ycF= (-115.6 - 87)/ 2 = -101.3
^, = -87 - (-30) = -57
0^= -115.6 - (-30) = -85.6
of„= (-80 - 110) /2 = -95
E/R oer *




2+ (7110 sin (- 1 01 . 3) ) 2
= 6983
R/RpET = 7110/6983 = 1.07
2600 884
^
2 R2 (cos(-57)-cos(-85.6) ) R2
88a 772
Oer * - " • y *'PET
Projected Ay:
Av(X'cf)= 5.U75isin (-101.3) 1 + . 35 |cos (- 10 1 . 3) | = 5.435
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pFirst find where fragment spray covers the target.
Knowing two angles, Y,= 87 and {>2-2f, )/2 = 14.3
and one side, side = target length / 2 = 10
RpfT = 40.4 ft. to cover target
P^/P at 40.4 ft. = 1 - exp ( (-772/40.42) X 5.435) = .92
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-'"RODrCED AT GOVERN„e,,t E
EARLY EIED
Dynamic spray angles:
^ /2000 sin (-30) + 7000 sin (-30 +80) \
' \2000 cos (-30) + 7000 cos (-30 +80) - (-1000)/
= +31
y /2000 sin{-30) + 7000 sin(-30 +110) '
0^- arc ^^ \^200 cos(-30) + 7000 cos(-30 +110) - (-1000)^
= + 56.2
Xf= ( 31 + 56.2 )/ 2 = U3.6
0,= 31 - (-30) = 61
0^= 56.2 - (-30) = 36.2
0^^^= (80 + 110)/2 = +95
1^*1=7(2000 + 7000 cos(95))2 + (7000 sin(95))2 = 7110
I
V^/^j = V(7110 cos (43. 6) - (-1000) )2+(7iio sin(a3.6))2
= 7864
R/RpE^ = 7110/7864 = .90
2600 983
/0(R) = =





Ay(ycF)= 5.475|sin (43.6) 1 + . 53 | cos (43. 6) | = 4^16
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First find where fragment spray covers the target.
Knowing two angles, ^= 56.2 and ilfz - Y, ) /2 = 12.5
and one side, side = target length / 2 = 10
Kper ~ 23.6 ft. to cover target
Pk//? at 23.6 ft. = 1 - exp( (-1220/23.62) X 4.16) = .9999
P^/jj at 40.4 ft. = 1 - exp ( (-1220/40.42) X 4.16) = .96
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D. DETERMINATION OF HEAPON SYSTEM LETHALITY
GIVEN:
Circle of Equal Probability CEP =
_50_£t:
or
standard deviation (J^= Hg^STft
fuzing probability P^ =
_0^Q_
fuze cutoff range r^ = _Nj^
fragment spray density as a
function of R pg^ p (Rp^^ ) = L220/3ff.T
projected vulnerable area Ay^ { Ycf )
for desired kill levels Ay (Yc^) = _2.JP__KK
= _m A
target altitude H =
_25_£t
center spray angle o^f ~ Jd^:.^-
Firing doctrine:
FIND
lethal radius (rjj )






Carlton scaling parameter (r„ )
for desired kill levels r^ = _73 KK
= /02.J__K
= N/\ B
single shot kill probability (Pkss )
.60 K





fuze cutoff correction factor = NA
sea skimmer correction factor = •.^uiL^'^ ^ '^
corrected kill probability P^^j = t^JUiLH^^^
cumulative kill probability
(weapon system lethality) P^ = ±ZS.!lL7^^^
EQUATIONS:
CEP = 1.177 (J,.
^K/p = 0.5 = 1 - exp(-(>(ra ) A,,)
r2 \
fuze cutoff factor = (1 - exp (Cg r|)
r2 + 2(j;2 \
Pk5S ^^["j 7 2{0;)2
C =
V 7 0-2^^2 <r^^ r/
sea skimmer correction factor;
1 r^^ / C2h2 \
1 / exp de
2 IT J \sin2 (2 77-©)/
h = H/ sin(rcp )
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CALCULATIONS:
Note; Data forOiRp^y.), ky , arA y^.^ are from the early
bird calculations.
Lethal radius: (r^ = Rp^^ for P^/^ = 0.5)
.5=1- exp((-1220/R2^^ )ky)
In. 5 = (-1220/R|^^ ) Ay
K KK
Tjj = 42 /a^ = 85.7 60.9
ro = 1.2 rj = 102.8 73.0
Pk5<; = -8 I ^) = -60 .as'^^^ \ri + 2(42.5) 2/
/
Sea skimmer correction;
h = 35/sin (43.6) = 51
r2 + 2 (42.5)2
C = <> = -3.92-4 -5E-4
^ 2 (42.5)2 r2
1 r^ / r h 2 \
1 /expf A d9 = .91 .94
2tr^j ^Vsin2(2tr- 9)7
corrected P/<s^ = .54 .45
cummulative P,^ : (2 tird salvo)
^K = 1 - n - Pk5s )" = .79 .70
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E. DETEBHINATION OF COMBAT SYSIEM LETHALITY
GIVEN:
TARGET DATA:
Cumulative kill probability Pj^ =
_t_ZO
Target altitude H = _35_'__
Target velocity V^ =
-JQQQJl^
Target separation interval ^t =
_i£.I^^
Number of attacking threats N^= [0
COMEAT SYSTEM DATA:
Kissile/pro jectile velocity V^ = 2000__
fire control acguisition time AT = i2_sec.
number of fire control radars
NFC = i
search radar height h =
_J?_^
antenna rotation interval ARI =
.?.L<?S_
weapon system minimum range fi^j„ = Jj.jvm._
FIND:
target detection range DR = IQ.'i nm
track range TR = iS^hZni-
velocity ratio VR = 2_/3
range of first intercept IR, = *?• 3
3
nm.








threat handling capacity TC =
_3
average target separation interval
for the next defense layer
before saturation <:^ tj = 33J3s€f.
after saturation ^t2= / *V-3 ^e^-
EQUATIONS:
radar horizon D = 1.23 (VT^ + VTT )
{D}= nm. {H} and {h} = ft.
DE = D + (0.5 X AEI x V^-)
TE = DR + (Vt X 2 AEI)
VE = V„ / (V« - Vr)
IE, = (TE + (AT X Vt-)) X VE
IE„+, = { IE„ + Vt (AT -At*") ) X VB
A^= At / NFC
TC = n for IE„^, < R^i„
IElU = (IP*. + Vt (AT - iAt*)) X VE
Ns = Ne (1 - Pk)




1-r = -1000 fps = - 1/6 nm/sec.
F.adar horizon;
D = 1.23 ( 35 + 90 ) = 19 cm.
Detection range;
DP. = 19 + (.5 X 8 X -1/6) = 18.33 nm.
Track range;
TR = 18.33 + (-1/6 X 2 X 8) = 15.66 nm.
Velocity ratio;
VE = (2000)/(2000 -(-1000)) = 2/3
Eange of first intercept;
IR, = (15.66 + (10 X -1/6)) X 2/3 = 9.33 nm. Engaged
Subsequent intercept ranges;
IR2= ( 9.33 - 1/6(10 - 10)) X 2/3 = 6.22 nm. Engaged
IF.3= ( 6.22 - 1/6(10 - 10))x 2/3 = 4.14 nm. Engaged
IEg= ( 4.14 - 1/6(10 - 10))x 2/3 = 2.76 nm. Leaker
IE5-= ( 4.14 - 1/6(10 - 20)) X 2/3 = 3.87 nm. Leaker
IR6= ( 4.14 - 1/6(10 - 30)) X 2/3 = 4.98 nm. Engaged
IR7= ( 4.98 - 1/6(10 - 10))x 2/3 = 3.32 nm. Leaker
IRg= ( 4.93 - 1/6(10 - 20))x 2/3 = 4.43 nm. Engaged
IR4= ( 4.43 - 1/6(10 - 10))x 2/3 = 2.95 nm. Leaker
IR,^= ( 4.43 - 1/6(10 - 20)) X 2/3 = 4.06 nm. Engaged
Threat capacity;
TC = 3
Threat interval for next layer;
Prior to saturation; Ng = 3 , Nj, =
N5= 3 (1-.7) = .9
2it2= (3 X 10)/.9 = 33.3 sec.
After saturation; %= 3 , Ni. = 4
N5= 3 (1-.7) = .9
^t2= (4 3)10 / (4 + .9) = 14.3 sec.
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APPENDIX C
GDN SISTEM ?S. CEOISE MISSILE
This is a case study of a generic medium caliber gun
system versus a generic sea skimming cruise missile. The
object of the case study is to determine the lethality of
the weapon system against the cruise missile and also to
assess the contribution of the weapon system to the overall
lethality of the associated comtat system.
A. flABHEAD PABAHETEBS
GIVEN charge weight C = ^iks.^ '^^ density = ""
metal weight M = 60 M- or density =
_3^
Guerney constant V2E = ?S00 or explosive: COMR B
static spray angles of, =
_30_
^2= J^P.
fragment size = . 5" ^ />? ^ and density = .263 f^yin
warhead geometry: (drawing or dimensions)
^0% o-f case i^ra(^ments
FIND: fragment weight in grains =
_
2 */ 7
charge to mass ratio C/M =
_±IJ33
fragment initial velocity V<, = JL'l/
total number of fragments N = I530
(N may be adjusted to reflect
percentage of case that fragments)
Useful Equations:







.53 in3 X .283 Ib/in^ x 7000 gr/lb = 247 grains
Charge to mass ratio;
C/M = 8/60 = . 1333
Fragment initial velocity;
Vo = 8800 X .1333 / (1 + .1333/2) = 3111 fps.
Number of fragments;
N = (.9 X 601bs. X 7000 gr/ib ) / 247 gr/frag = 1530
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B, TARGET DESCRIPTICH
GIVEN: target velocity V-p = zJOOOfpi




Presented area k^ = 28.5'fi^
Minimum kill categories required:
(function of range and velocity)
KK < 10000 yds
Critical components for selected kill categories;
guidance, warhead, engine , fuel tank
ESTIMATE: component P^/^ for the desired kill categories:
see table 2










Early or late bird = 3-3-^- _m
static warhead 0<, = _30_
spray angles (X^ =
_L50
fragment number N = J500__




velocity V„ oc Vp = 20O0ips
missile approach angle 8 = JZA~.
target velocity Vy = -JODO_ffS




(* values may be adjusted to reflect average velocities)







range ratio R/Rper -
-L^P—
fragment spray densities
as a function of R p (R) = 2§f/3l




Probability of a kill given a
detonation Pk/o {(pi^m) » ^v iYcf) ) = ^t^jllt^^'^
(calculate at various points as desired)
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EQUATIONS:
^ / ^M sin (9) + Ve, sin{e+o(ji) \
tli = arctan I
\ V„ cos (0) + V^ cos(a+o<i) - {V^)J
Xf= ( ac + ^2 )/2
Rofr it^/r 1
IV/^ 1 = Y(Vm + Vo cosofcp)2 + (V^ siii^c,)^
\\/T l=V<^^'^ cos{^^) - V^)2 + (V^^ siny^^)2
N
^ 2'Tr X E2 X (cos (^) - cos (^) )
Projected Ay = Ay^ IsinCy^p)! + A^/^ icos(y^p)





y/ /2000 sin (-10) + 7000 sin (-10 +30)
Oi = arctan (\2000 cos (-10) + 7000 cos (-10 +30) - (-1000),
= 6
y / 2000 sin (-10) + 7000 sin(-10 +150)
"^ \ 2000 cos(-IO) + 7000 cos(-10 +150) - (-1000)
= + 60
XcF= ( 6 + 60 )/ 2 = 33
0, = 6 - (-10) =16
(^2= 60 - (-10) = 70
0(tf= (30 + 150)/2 =90
\%^\=^{2000 + 2800 cos (90)) 2 + (2800 sin (90)) 2 = 3441
\ff/J\=^/{3HH^ cos (33) - (-1000) ) 2 + (344 1 sin (33)) 2 = 4314
E/Rpg^ = 3441/4314 = .80
1500 385





Av(^cf}= 2.85|sin (33) I + .18|cos(33)| = 1.70
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First find where fragment spray covers the target.
Knowing two angles, jr,= 6 and (J^-^i ) /2 = 27
and one side, side = target length / 2 = 10'
Rpfj = 2.3 ft. to cover target
P^/P at 2.3 ft. = 1 - exp{ (-602/2. 32) X 1.70) = 1.0
Ph/d at aO.4 ft. = 1 - exp( (-602/40.42) X i,70) = .47
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D. DETEBMINATION OF WEAPON SYSIEM LETHALITY
GIVEN:




fuzing probability P^ =
_0_6_
fuze cutoff range r^ =
_60
fragment spray density as a
function of Rp^r Di^oEr ) ' ^DJLl3^2^r
projected vulnerable area Ay{ycp)








target altitude H =
_3_5_
center spray angle Ocf =
_2^
Firing doctrine:
open fire at 10000 yds. firing 15 rounis/min











Carlton scaling parameter (rj^ )








single shot kill probability (P/f59 )




fuze cutoff correction factor





CEP = 1. 177 OV











fuze cutoff factor = (1 - exp (C^ r^)
c =(- JLl-lJJLt _"\
sea skimmer correction factor;
1 r^^ / c^h2 \
1 exp— de
2fr J \sin2(2ir -d) /




.5 = exp(-p A^r)
In (.5) = (-602/R^^) x 1.7
Efer = '"^^^ ==> ^oer ^^^ ^K/o
Carlton scaling parameter;
r^ = 1.2 r^ = 46 ft.
of .5 = 38.4 = r.
Calculation of PKSS
46 2
462 + 2(CEP/1. 177)2^
X 0.6
CEP must be determined at the various intercept
ranges in order to calculate P^^j.
For 3 mil CEP
CEP = 3yds /thousand yds of range
= 9 ft / (intercept range/1000)
Intercept range (IR)
IE = firing range (FE ) x VR
VE = V„ / (Vrt- V,.) = 2/3
Firing range; (fires every 60/15 = 4 sec)
FE = 10000 yds + (i x V^ x 4) i= 0,1,2,..,
Fuze cutoff factor;
/2 (CEP/1. 177) 2_+ r,2\ 1
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E. DETEEMINATION OF COMBAT SYSTEM LETHALITY
GIVEN;
TARGET DATA:
Cumulative kill probability P^^ =
_i^_l9_




Target separation interval At2= l}iiJLJ£*^^ ^af.




Missile/projectile velocity Vp = 2_000jps
fire control acquisition time AT =
_^£i-_
number of fire control radars
NFC = i
search radar height h =
_^0_
antenna rotation interval ARI =
_3jL'z
weapon system minimum range R^,-^ = 22.9£.l4}
FIND:
target detection range DR =
_tL^__
track range TR =
_t!Ji_
velocity ratio VR =
_2_/3
range of first intercept IR, =
_6_667y^$.












threat handling capacity TC =
__2?__.
average target separation interval
for the next defense layer
before saturation /^t,=
_MA._,
after saturation /C:it.= N f{
EQOATIONS:
radar horizon D = 1.23 (Vh + VT )
p}= nin. {H} and {h}= ft.
DE = D - (0.5 X ARI X V^.
)
TS = DE - (Vt X 2 ARI)
VE = V„ / (V„ - V^)
IE, = (TR + (AT X V,.}) X VB
IE„^, = { IE„ + V7.(AT -£.^)} X VE
At^= At / NFC
TC = n for IE„^, < E,^;^
IEl+,- = (IRl + 7p(AT - iAtt) X VE
Ns = Ng (1 - P^)
Atg = (Ni. + N£)At, / (N^. + Ng)
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CALCULATIONS:
Since the gun system fires continuously at one target
until it is destroyed or reaches minimum range, the total
engagement time is a function of acquisition time and the
time required between the initial and the final shot. Thus
ET = AT »• i^sHOTs^ ""J ^60 / firing rate)
= 9 ^ (N5^or5- 1) (60/15)
The limiting engagement time is nine seconds, which means
the system could engage a different target every nine
seconds with one shot.
The first target to be engaged by the gun system will
have the maximum cumulative P^ . The cumulative P^ for
subsequent targets will depend on the target separation
interval. For subsequent targets, assuming the final shot
against the first target is fired at the minimum firing
range of 2000 yards, the relationship between target separa-
tion interval, number of shots fired, and cumulative P^ are
calculated using the data of table 3. Table 4 shows the
results.
For the mean threat interval prior to missile system
saturation, t = 33.3 seconds, table 4 shows that the gun
system would be able to engage a surviving target with the
maximum cumulative P,^ of 0.948. Following missile system
saturation the average threat interval is reduced to 14.3
seconds. From table 4, the gun system can engage subsequent
targets at that inteval with a F^^ of 0.76. From Appendix B,
actual target threat intervals after saturation will be
either ten or twenty seconds. For the ten second intervals
the gun system P|< is 0.546, and for the twenty second inter-
vals the P^ is 0.853.
The threat capacity of the gun system is
TC = 1 for At^ < 9 sec.
= oo with reduced Pj< for 9 < /it < 33 sec.
= 00 with P^ = .948 for A^ > 33 sec.
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TABLE 4












<9 — — 1
9 1 2008 1339 .546 .454
13 2 3340 2227 .760 .240
17 3 4672 3116 .853 .147
21 4 6004 4004 .893 .102
25 5 7336 4893 .923 .077
29 6 8668 5781 .939 .061
33 7 10000 6667 .948 .052
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